Volume 2, Issue 5, October 2013, Page: 196-201
The Shallow Processing of Logical Negation
Guillermo Macbeth, National University of Entre Rios, Parana, Argentina; National Scientific and Technical Research Council, Argentina
Eugenia Razumiejczyk, National University of Entre Rios, Parana, Argentina; National Scientific and Technical Research Council, Argentina
Maria del Carmen Crivello, National University of Entre Rios, Parana, Argentina
Mauro Fioramonti, National University of Entre Rios, Parana, Argentina
Carolina I. Pereyra Girardi, National Scientific and Technical Research Council, Argentina;University of Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Received: Oct. 29, 2013;       Published: Nov. 20, 2013
DOI: 10.11648/j.pbs.20130205.15      View  2768      Downloads  160
Abstract
The aim of this study is to introduce a novel reasoning phenomenon concerned with the shallow processing of negation in the context of sentential reasoning. By analogy to other psychological explanations that account for superficial responses with conditionals, this study proposes an account for biconditionals derived from a recent theory of negation. This theory predicts that the psychological use of negation returns small scope products. This would happen because the human mind tends to avoid the working memory overload by simplifying its reasoning processes. A within-subjects experimental design was applied to test this conjecture. Results were consistent with such small scope negation prediction. The obtained evidence extends the observation of shallow reasoning processes to the negation of conjunctions and disjunctions that take the form of biconditionals. The results of this study support a mental models approach to account for the psychology of logical negation.
Keywords
Reasoning, Logic, Negation, Cognition, Shallow Processing
To cite this article
Guillermo Macbeth, Eugenia Razumiejczyk, Maria del Carmen Crivello, Mauro Fioramonti, Carolina I. Pereyra Girardi, The Shallow Processing of Logical Negation, Psychology and Behavioral Sciences. Vol. 2, No. 5, 2013, pp. 196-201. doi: 10.11648/j.pbs.20130205.15
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